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Historically, courts usually paid little attention to the child's wishes
in deciding which parent should have custody upon divorce. Today,
statutes in many states direct courts to consider the child's pre-
ference, often as one among several factors that guide decision
making.' With some exceptions, the law gives only general guidance
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' See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1988) (court shall give due
weight to wishes of child capable of intelligent preference). The Michigan statute
is representative of legislative efforts to guide judicial decision making about cus-
tody and indirectly limit discretion. It lists several factors to be considered by the
court including:
(a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the
parties involved and the child.
(b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the
child love, affection, and guidance and continuation of the educating
and raising of the child in its religion or creed, if any.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the
child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recog-
nized and permitted under the laws of this state in place of medical
care, and other material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory
environment, and the desirability of maintaining a continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed
custodial home or homes.
(f) The moral fitness of the parties involved.
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and does not specify under what circumstances and to what extent
the child's desire should affect the decision.' Little is known about
how important this factor is, what variables influence the weight
accorded the child's preference, or how courts obtain and evaluate
evidence about the child's wishes.3
This Article began as a straightforward empirical study of the
way in which courts in one state involve children in proceedings to
decide their custody when their parents divorce. 4 We were interested
in how judges obtained information about children's preferences as
well as judicial perceptions about the children's responses. We also
wanted to learn about the extent to which judges considered the
child's preference in deciding custody suits and the factors that
influenced this calculation.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved.
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child
to be of sufficient age to express preference.
() The willingness and ability of each of the parents to facilitate and
encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the
child and the other parent.
(k) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a par-
ticular child custody dispute.
MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 722.23 (West. Supp. 1988).
For a review of the trend toward legal consideration of the child's preference
regarding custody, see Siegel & Hurley, The Role of the Child's Preference in
Custody Proceedings, 11 FAMi. L.Q. 1 (1977); Jones, Judicial Questioning of Chil-
dren in Custody and Visitation Proceedings, 18 FAm. L.Q. 43 (1984). See also W.
KRAm & N. FRANK, Trm LAW OF CHILD CUSTODY: DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBSTAN-
TrvE LAW (1982).
2 The exceptions include prescriptions about considering the preference of a
child above a given age. See Harbin v. Harbin, 238 Ga. 109, 230 S.E.2d 889
(1976) (child fourteen years or more is mature enough to select the parent with
whom he desires to live despite previous adjudications that the parent was unfit);
OIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (Baldwin 1983) (child twelve years or older may
choose parent unless court finds selected parent unfit); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-
l(a) (Supp. 1988) (child fourteen or older may choose parent unless parent unfit).
I For an empirical study of judicial interviewing of children, see Lombard,
Judicial Interviewing of Children in Custody Cases: An Empirical and Analytic
Study, 17 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 807 (1984). For a study of the attitudes of judges
and attorneys toward children's participation and preference in custody decisions,
see Felner, Terre, Farber, Primavera, Goldfarb, Aber & Bishop, Party Status Qf
Children During Marital Dissolution: Child Preference and Legal Representation in
Custody Decisions, 14 J. CLINICAL CHLDr PSYCHOLOGY 42 (1985).
1 For a description of the study, see Part 11, infra.
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The study consisted of a survey of judges in Virginia, a state in
which the statutory provision regulating custody decisions does not
explicitly direct courts to consider the child's preference.5 We as-
sumed that, despite the absence of statutory guidance, courts would
consult with and be influenced by the preferences of at least some
children. This proved to be correct. The study yielded several in-
teresting findings about the role of children in judicial decision
making and about the process of involving children in custody pro-
ceedings. We examine these findings and analyze their legal impli-
cations in Parts II and III of the Article.
On reflection, the most interesting lesson of this study was derived
from our initial assumption that the child's preference would count
in some custody decisions despite the absence of statutory direction.
Analysis of the data suggested that for courts making custody de-
cisions, the weight accorded the child's preferences was directly cor-
related to the age of the child. Indeed, the uniformity of judicial
response suggested that courts apply an implicit rule favoring the
parent preferred for custody by the adolescent child. Further, cus-
tody of older children is litigated less frequently than is that of
younger children, suggesting that parents may also defer to the
wishes of adolescents. These findings suggest that parents and judges
are guided in making decisions about custody by a social norm
supporting participation by adolescents in important decisions af-
fecting their lives.
This admittedly tentative hypothesis suggests a broader theme.
Because custody decision rules regulate important long-term
relationships, social norms may play a uniquely important role; the
relationship between legal rules and social norms in this context
5 See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (Supp. 1988). The statute explicitly directs
consideration of several other factors:
The court, in determining custody . . . shall consider the following:
a. The age and physical and mental condition of the child or chil-
dren;
b. The age and physical and mental condition of each parent;
c. The relationship existing between each parent and each child;
d. The needs of the child or children;
e. The role which each parent has played, and will play in the future,
in the upbringing and care of the child or children; and
f. Such other factors as are necessary to consider the best interest
of the child or children.
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merits more thoughtful examination than it has yet received. 6 Evolv-
ing child custody law may be better understood if studied against
a backdrop of changing family roles.7
Part I of this Article examines the trend toward recognizing chil-
dren's custody preferences. It describes the related debate over
whether the child should have a decisional role and, if so, how
evidence should be elicited. Part II describes the findings of a study
of attitudes and practices of judges who decide custody cases
in Virginia. The study was designed to determine whether children's
preferences counted in the judicial decision and by what means
evidence of these preferences was elicited.
In Part III we analyze the findings of the Virginia study and
suggest implications for legal policy. We conclude that a short,
private judicial interview directed solely at eliciting the preference
of the adolescent child who wants to have a voice in the decision
represents the optimal accommodation of the conflicting interests of
parents and children in custody determinations. We further argue
that the implicit legal rule favoring the custodial choice of adoles-
cent children should be adopted as a presumption. The "ado-
lescent preference" rule is consistent with developmental knowledge
about adolescence and with the legal trend toward recognition of
adolescent autonomy in other settings. Moreover, such a rule
6 Robert Ellickson has studied the way in which social norms complement and
even supplant legal rules in regulating relationships and resolving disputes among
cattle owners and other residents of Shasta County, California. Ellickson, Of Coase
and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L.
REv. 623 (1986). See also Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and Sociological
Theories of Social Control, 16 J. LEGAL STUm. 67 (1987) [hereinafter Ellickson,
Critique] (an examination of social norms and other social control mechanisms).
Stewart Macauley studied relationships among Wisconsin business firms and found
that norms of honoring commitments and producing a good product and standing
behind it were important regulators of behavior among firms. Macaulay, Non-
Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55
(1963). Robert Scott argued that social norms together with non-bargained patterns
of cooperation play an important role in regulating long term contractual relation-
ships. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. RaV.
2005 (1987).
7 This perspective may have prescriptive importance as well. Legal rules that
depart significantly from social norms are costly to enforce and may result in
unintended effects. Some aspects of the recent trend toward joint custody indicate
a failure to calculate the importance of existing norms in pursuing a goal of social
change. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
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encourages private ordering and lends greater certainty to custody
decision making for a significant category of cases.
In Part IV, we examine the basis of the "adolescent preference"
rule and suggest that it is derived from a modern social norm
supporting a voice for teenagers in important matters affecting their
lives. In general, social norms and customs regarding family roles
tend to play a critical role in custody decisions and policies. We
suggest that the precision or generality of custody decision rules is
positively (and perhaps normatively) linked to the extent of the
social consensus about family roles in marriage and divorce. At-
tending to the function of social norms in custody law may offer
a valuable perspective for legal policy.
I. INVOLVING CHILDREN IN CUSTODY DISPUTES: THE SCOPE OF THE
CONTROVERSY
In recent years, statutory law in many states has attempted to
guide the judicial inquiry in divorce custody disputes by specifying
the factors to be considered in the decision.' One factor that has
been emphasized is the child's preference regarding her future cus-
todian. Increasingly, judges are directed by statute to solicit and
consider the child's wishes. In a few states, the older child's choice
as to custodial parent must be honored by the court except in
unusual circumstances. 9 At least in these jurisdictions, the directive
that the child's preference regarding custody be honored constitutes
a new decision rule for custody of older children, supplementing
and redefining the best interest of the child standard.
A. The Substantive Focus and the Child's Preferences
The movement toward allowing the child to have a role in the
custody decision may be seen in two lights. In part, it reflects a
growing skepticism about the paternalism of traditional legal policy
toward children.10 Increasingly, the law recognizes that children have
1 E.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23 fVest Supp. 1988), quoted at supra
note 1.
9 See supra note 2.
1o In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S.
503 (1969), the Supreme Court for the first time recognized children as "persons"
with a constitutionally protected interest in free expression. Id. at 511. The trend
toward reduced paternalism is also reflected in the law regulating minor's medical
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a legitimate interest in the important decisions affecting their lives.
This trend is supported by research on children's competency which
suggests that adolescents, at least in some situations, may reason
like adults in decision making." To be sure, the relevance of notions
of "competency" in decision making by children about their own
custody is not well defined. Indeed, a cynic might suggest that the
law has turned to children to make custody decisions because of
dissatisfaction with the performance of parents and judges. None-
theless, the hope is that involving the child will result in a better
outcome-or at least one that is more acceptable to the child.
This suggests another meaning of the trend toward recognizing
children's preferences about custody. The history of custody law is
one of optimism followed by disappointment as the law has searched
for an optimal means of resolving custody disputes.' 2 The tender
years presumption, the best interest of the child standard, and a
presumption favoring joint custody have each in turn been embraced
and reproductive decisions. See generally ADOLESCENT ABORTION (G. Melton ed.
1985) (a review of the legal, social science, clinical, and ethical dimensions of
adolescent abortion decisions); CmLDREN'S COMPErENCE To CONSENT (G. Melton,
G. Koocher & M. Saks eds. 1983) (law and social science perspectives on adolescent
decision making about medical matters, etc.). The most important changes may be
in regulation of juvenile delinquency adjudication. In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967), the United States Supreme Court accorded juveniles facing delinquency
charges many procedural protections of adult criminal defendants, including the
right to an attorney, to cross-examine witnesses, and to remain silent. Id. at 10-
24. For a thoughtful analysis of legal policy toward adolescents, see F. ZIMlUNo,
Tim CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE (1982). Zimring argues for a legal
stance that recognizes the semi-autonomous status of adolescents and allows op-
portunity to experiment with adult decision making while protecting minors from
undue costs of mistakes.
" See CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT, supra note 10. The findings of
two research studies are noteworthy. Lois Weithom found that 14-year-olds reasoned
about medical decisions similarly to adults. Weithom & Campbell, The Competency
of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEY.
1589 (1982). The other study, conducted by Thomas Grisso and associates, examined
the competency of minors to understand and waive their Miranda rights. Grisso found
that 15-year-olds of normal intelligence understood their Miranda rights as well as
adults, but that younger children had reduced comprehension. T. Giusso, JuvENmEs'
WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE (1981).
12 See Derdeyn, Child Custody Decisions in Historical Perspective, 133(2) Am.




with enthusiasm; however, each has proved unsatisfactory, either
intrinsically or in application."' The search continues for a custody
rule that will result in the "right" decision without increasing the
already considerable destructive impact of divorce on children. Some
observers argue that a rule recognizing the child's preference as a
primary factor in the custody decision will achieve this elusive goal."
According to this view, allowing the child to make the custody
decision will result in the best possible custodial arrangement. More-
over, such a rule is easy to apply and avoids the punishing enforce-
ment costs of the best interest standard.
The child's role in the decision making process has become more
controversial as it has increased in importance. Critics, often in the
mental health profession, question the child's competency to make
this decision.' 5 Others suggest that if the law focuses on the child's
preference, children will unwillingly be made to assume a decisional
role in a situation in which they experience conflicting loyalties, and
that this will increase pressure at an already stressful time.'6 Judicial
opinions have also reflected concern about the risk of psychological
damage to a child called upon to express in court a preference for
1" In part, this is due to the dilemma posed by the resolution of custody deci-
sions. As Robert Mnookin has pointed out, the ability to predict outcomes of
alternative custody arrangements is poor, and there is no consensus about what
values should be promoted by the custody arrangement. This makes rule formu-
lation difficult. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the
Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CoNratP. PRons. 226, 292 (Summer 1975). See
also Scott & Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 Otno ST. L.J. 455 (1984)
(recent enthusiasm for joint custody represents, in part, an effort to fashion a
decision principle that functions more satisfactorily than the tender years presump-
tion or the best interest standard).
14 See Melton & Lind, Procedural Justice in Family Court: Does the Adversary
Model Make Sense?, in LEGAL REFORMS AFFECTING CHILD AND YouTH SEnavicEs
65 (1982) (children should have party status in custody proceedings); Bersoff, Rep-
resentation for Children in Custody Decisions: All that Glitters is Not Gault, 15 J.
F.Am. LAw 27 (1976-77) (argues for providing representation for children and mak-
ing them an integral part of the custody decision).
". Schuman, The Unreliability of Children's Expression of Preference in Do-
mestic Relations Litigation: A Psychiatric Approach, 69 MASs. L. REv. 14 (1984)
(arguing that although some children are competent to express custodial preference,
most children are not).
,6 Emery, Child Custody Decision-Making (April 1987) (paper presented at the
Conference of the Society for Research in Child Development) (arguing that the
tension of divorce will be heightened if children are pressured to choose between
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one parent over the other. As one court stated, "The principles of
humanitarianism are so strongly against the placing of a child be-
tween his parents that we feel the trial court should have a wide
latitude in protecting the child.' ' 7
In contrast, supporters of a decisional role for the child argue
that the child has a right to participate in the proceedings in a
manner corresponding to her preferences and capacities.', Other
supporters argue that the child will benefit from having a voice in
such a critically important decision.' 9 The child whose strong desires
about custody are ignored may suffer greatly-she may be dissat-
isfied with the outcome and feel helpless about her situation. 20 No
research has directly tested these contradictory assertions.
There is also much controversy and uncertainty about the way in
which these legal provisions are, or should be, applied. Except under
laws that direct courts to follow the preferences of children above
a given age, statutory provisions are usually general guidelines, di-
recting consideration of the child's wishes among several other
factors. 2' The variables that should affect the weight to be given to
the child's preference are seldom defined by law; little is known
about how the child's wishes affect the calculations judges make in
different cases and under different statutes, including those that do
not specifically refer to the child's preference. Age, maturity, the
parents); J. WESTMAN, CMD ADVOCACY 253 (1979) ("generally speaking it is not
fair to place a child in the position of making choices between parents").
17 Parker v. Parker, 467 S.W.2d 595, 597 (Ky. 1971).
Is See Bersoff, supra note 14; see also MacDougall, The Child as Participant
in Divorce Proceedings, 3 CAN. J. FAm. L. 141, 162-63 (1980) (suggesting that
the child's interest in custody proceedings may be better promoted if the child
has legal representation and if a legislative directive requires judges to consider
teenagers' custodial wishes).
'9 See Melton & Lind, supra note 14; Newman & Collester, Children Should
Be Seen and Heard: Techniques for Interviewing the Child in Contested Custody
Proceedings, 2(4) FAM. ADVOCATE 8, 10 (1980) ("the bottom line is children have
a lot to say if only we take time to listen").
- Cf. LEARNED HELPLESSNESS THEORY AND COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY: THEORBT-
ICAL AND EMPIRICAL APPROACHES 121 (M. Gibbs, J. Lachenmeyer & J. Sigal eds.
1980) (learned helplessness theory describes psychologically debilitating effects that
result from lack of control over events).
23 See factors listed in MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23, supra note 1. See
also UNF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1987); ARIZ. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 332 (Supp. 1987).
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reasons for the choice, and the intensity of the preference would
seem to be relevant; however, little research on judicial decision
making has been reported.Y On reflection, it is puzzling that sup-
porters and critics of a decisional role for the child have not gen-
erally focused on the age of the child as important in determining
the child's role.23
B. Procedural Issues
Little research exists on the process by which the child's prefer-
ence is elicited. The spectre of reluctant children enduring cross-
examination in open court has been raised by critics who presume
that participation in adversary proceedings is harmful to children.2?
Indeed, in another context, concern about the presumed harm to
children of testifying in sexual abuse prosecutions has led to pro-
cedural reforms such as videotaped testimony and special
arrangements for testimony out of the courtroom.- A few courts
= Felner and his colleagues studied attitudes of judges and attorneys toward
children's participation in custody proceedings. Felner, supra note 3, at 44-48.
Lowery studied the variables taken into account by Kentucky judges in making
custody decisions by presenting judges with a list of factors that might be relevant
and asking them to indicate the importance of each. She found that the child's
preference was one factor taken into account but that it was not accorded signif-
icant weight. Lowery did not attempt to examine the variables such as age or
maturity that might correlate to the weight accorded the child's preference. Lowery,
Child Custody Decisions in Divorce Proceedings: A Survey of Judges, 12 PROF.
PSYCHOLOGY 492, 496-97 (1981).
1 Further, researchers studying custody decision making have not examined how
age might affect this factor. See description of study by Lowery, supra note 22,
at 494-95.
See Siegel & Hurley, supra note 1, at 43 (judicial aversion to bringing children
into court to testify about custodial preferences is based on concern that this would
result in psychological harm); Jones, supra note 1, at 74 ("under no circumstances
should a child in a custody or visitation proceeding be questioned in open court").
2 The appropriate legal response to the problem of protecting child witnesses
in sexual abuse cases has been the subject of much controversy. Child victims are
presumed to be vulnerable to psychological harm if they testify against defendants
in sexual abuse trials. Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Pro-
secutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HAnv. L. Rnv. 806, 807 (1985). Among
the reform proposals are provisions for the admissibility into evidence of a videotaped
pretrial interview of the child, id. at 813; some states allow the child to testify
out of the courtroom (with closed circuit television). A California statute allows
the judge to order out-of-court testimony in a narrow category of cases in which
testimony may be presumed traumatic. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West Supp.
1988). Other states provide special exceptions to the hearsay rule that allow a third
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have held that the judge must allow a competent child called by a
party to testify in custody cases.26 However, there is little evidence
of judicial attitudes and practices or of how frequently children
actually act as witnesses.
An alternative means of obtaining evidence from children in cus-
tody proceedings is the judicial interview in chambers." The inter-
view has been promoted as a means for the child to express a
preference regarding custody in a less stressful setting, in which fear
of adverse parental reaction may be reduced. On the other hand,
a private interview may preclude parents from hearing all the evidence
relevant to the custody decision.2 8 This is particularly troublesome
if the child not only reveals her preference, but also comments on
relevant parental behavior not previously known to the court (such
party to testify about the child's statements in sexual abuse cases. See, e.g., WAsH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (1988). Critics of procedural reforms have focused
on the harm to defendants' rights if children are permitted to provide evidence in
a manner that avoids confrontation and cross-examination by the defendant. Note,
supra, at 809, 811-16. In 1988, the United States Supreme Court held that the
sixth amendment right of confrontation of a defendant charged with sexual assault
of a minor was violated by the use of a screen placed between the child witness
and the defendant. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988). The screen, which was
designed to allow the complaining witness to avoid viewing the defendant while
giving testimony, was authorized under a 1985 Iowa statute. 1d. at 2798 n.l. In
an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court emphasized that the right of confrontation
signified the right to a face-to-face encounter. Id. at 2801. In a rigorous dissent,
Justice Blackmun criticized this literal reading of the sixth amendment. Id. at 2805-
10. The conflict between protecting the interests of children and those against whom
they would offer evidence is analogous to the child custody context. For a review
of the research literature on child sexual abuse and a description of the legal
reforms, see J. HAUGAARD & N.D. REPPuccI, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: AN INTEORA-
TION OF THEORY, RESEARCH, AND CLINIcAL PRACTICs (1988).
26 See J.L.W. v. D.C.W., 519 S.W.2d 724 (Mo. App. 1975) (parent has a right
to call upon his children, if competent, to testify in a child custody proceeding
where such evidence is relevant).
27 Indeed, some observers apparently assume that testimony in court is inappro-
priate and that interview by a judge is the only option for obtaining evidence from
the child. See Comment, Child Custody: The Judicial Interview of the Child, 47
LA. L. REv. 559, 559-61 (1987) ("It seems clear that putting the child on the
witness stand in a custody case, and expecting him to express a preference or
reveal damaging facts about one or both parents is almost certain to make the
situation worse.").
A private judicial interview of a five-year-old child was struck down in Wa.




as drug or alcohol use, physical abuse, or sexual activities). Some
states require that in-chambers interviews be recorded and made
available to parties and their attorneys.2- In general, however, little
is known about judicial practice in responding to potentially con-
flicting interests in this setting.
Three interrelated issues emerge from the debate over the child's
role in custody decisions. The first is the issue of whether parti-
cipating in the decision is harmful or beneficial to the child. The
second question focuses on the weight accorded the child's prefer-
ence by courts and the factors that influence the decisional weight.
Finally, the debate focuses on how information about the child's
wishes is elicited and whether courts can (or do) balance three
potentially conflicting interests-the state's interest in the accuracy
of evidence,30 the child's interest in expressing her wishes with min-
imal psychological stress, and the contesting parents' interest in
hearing relevant evidence.
The age of the child would seem to be a key variable in thinking
coherently about these issues. The appropriateness of a decisional
role for the child, the weight accorded the child's pref-
erences, the probable psychological harm, and the reliability of the
expressed preferences may all correlate to the age and maturity of
the child. Thus, any analysis of particular issues that fails to dis-
tinguish between older and younger children may have limited value.
II. AN EmPIIcA. STUDY OF JuDiclAL A rrruDr-s AND PRAcTcES
We undertook the empirical study described below to learn about
three related aspects of the role of children in custody disputes.
First we wanted to determine whether courts making divorce custody
decisions in Virginia consider the preferences of children, despite
the absence of statutory directives to do so." If so, we were inter-
ested in learning what variables determined whether the child's pref-
erence counted in the custody decision. Our second focus was
procedural. We wanted to learn how courts obtained evidence from
children, what attitudes judges held towards different means of
29 See, e.g., id.
30 The state as parens patriae also has an interest in protecting the child from
undue stress.
:' See supra note 5.
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eliciting children's preferences, and judicial perceptions about the
psychological harm or benefit to children from participating in the
process. We also wanted to determine, at least indirectly, whether
judges were concerned about parents' due process rights, and the
extent to which they accommodated the tension between parents'
and children's interests. Third, and related to both substantive and
procedural issues, we hoped to evaluate the relevance of the child's
age to judicial attitudes and practices concerning children's prefer-
ence issues.
The survey was directed at juvenile court and circuit court
judges in Virginia who together decide all custody cases in
that state.3 2 Eighty-six male and two femile judges responded, 3
ranging in age from 33 to 69, with an average age of 53 years.
One issue was whether the attitudes of the two judicial groups
would differ. We speculated that the juvenile court judges might
reflect the paternalistic philosophy of the traditional juvenile court,
perhaps being less inclined to give substantive weight to the child's
preference and less concerned about procedural rights of parties
than circuit court judges. To the contrary, however, the groups were
virtually indistinguishable in their attitudes and practices.14
The judges reported that children below the age of six were the
subject of fifty percent of litigated custody disputes," and most
agreed that children's wishes in this age group were irrelevant to
the decision. In contrast, the vast majority of judges reported that
12 In Virginia, juvenile and domestic relations district court judges have juris-
diction to decide disputes about custody and visitation and to order child support.
Only judges in the circuit court (the trial court of record) have jurisdiction over
divorce suits.
11 Questionnaires were sent to all juvenile and circuit court judges. Almost two-
thirds (44) of the 69 juvenile and domestic relations court judges responded and
slightly over one-third (44) of the 125 circuit court judges. Since divorce and
custody cases represent a relatively small portion of the subject matter encountered
by circuit court judges (who hear civil and criminal cases), they may have had less
interest in the survey.
34 One reason for this may be that most juvenile court judges were appointed
well after the reform movement in juvenile justice began. The mean year of ap-
pointment was 1977-78. Procedural reforms in the juvenile justice system began
with the United States Supreme Court's opinion in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967),
and by the late 1970s the informal paternalistic model was considerably weakened.
11 In Part IV, infra, we analyze the possible relevance of the finding that parents
apparently are much more inclined to litigate custody of younger children.
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they routinely attempted in some way to get information about older
children's wishes. Even for children in the six to nine year age
group, sixty-five percent of judges tried to obtain some information
about the child's preference, although usually not directly from the
child. 36 For children over fourteen years of age, ninety-seven percent
of judges considered the child's views.
A. The Interview in Chambers
The interview of the child in chambers was preferred by two-
thirds of the judges as the means of learning about the child's
wishes. Even among circuit court judges, who might be assumed to
be more concerned about procedural correctness, only one judge
favored testimony in court over the in-chambers interview. About
thirty-four percent of the judges preferred to elicit evidence about
the child's wishes indirectly, through testimony of mental health
professionals, parties, or guardians ad litem. More than two-thirds
said they routinely interviewed children fourteen and over; one half
typically saw ten to thirteen year olds, but less than one quarter
interviewed six to nine year olds as a general practice. Few judges
ever interviewed children under the age of six years.
Two-thirds of the judges polled stated that they preferred not to
initiate the judicial interview themselves, although many would do
so if they thought it important. 37 The judicial interview was usually
requested by one of the parents' attorneys. The interview in chambers
typically lasted less than fifteen minutes.3 8 Most judges believed that
children wanted to talk to them; seldom did children resist. Judges
also typically believed that they established rapport with the child
and that children were generally candid in the interview.39
3 Less than one-quarter routinely interview children in this age group.
37 This may reflect due process concerns, since judges in most circumstances do
not call witnesses. Custody suits are generally treated as unique, however; for
example, mental health professionals may evaluate the family and testify at the
court's initiative.
38 This comports with the research results of Lombard, who found judicial
interviews of children in her study to last eighteen minutes. Lombard, supra note
3. Although the "inadequacy" of brief interviews has been the focus of much
criticism, we argue that such interviews may represent the best available accom-
modation of conflicting interests.
39 Seventy-three percent believed they established rapport; ninety percent believed
children were candid.
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The majority of the judges talked to the child alone. When other
participants, such as the parents' attorneys, were allowed to partic-
ipate, they were generally restricted to observing and listening to
the judge's interview. For example, only a small minority of judges40
suggested that parents' attorneys ever asked any questions. Of those
courts in which parents' attorneys were present, about half of the
judges believed that this inhibited the child; most judges4 believed
children would rather talk to them alone. Guardians ad litem were
viewed as less objectionable than parents' attorneys and were more
likely to be allowed to participate in the interview.42 On the other
hand, few judges43 involved mental health professionals in the in-
terview, although this practice is frequently recommended in the
mental health literature."4
Judges described the most important purposes of the interview as
getting an impression of the child to compare with other evidence 45
and learning the child's wishes regarding custody.46 Some judges
also acknowledged that, through the interview, they hoped to learn
about the parents' behavior and activities 47 and to confirm the ve-
racity of the parents' evidence. 4
Data gleaned from the follow-up interviews of a sampling of
judges indicated that many judges attempted to ensure the child's
confidentiality. 49 Several judges reported that they did not disclose
- Seventeen percent.
41 Seventy-eight percent.
42 Thirty percent of judges allowed guardians ad litem.
43 Eight percent.
- See M. GOLDZBAND, CONSULTIING IN CHmD CUSTODY 129-45 (1982) (the use
of a mental health professional as a liaison in court is a new concept, but one
that ought to increase and become rapidly accepted); J. VEsTMAN, supra note 16,
at 284 (mental health professionals may increasingly aid courts and families to
arrive at rational decisions in disputes concerning their children).
" Sixty-nine percent designated this as "very important." We are somewhat
skeptical about the importance attached to this by the judges. Any interest that
courts have in making an independent judgment about the child would seem to
apply to children of all ages. Yet, judges rarely interview young children.
,6 This was designated "very important" by fifty-eight percent of judges.
" This was described as "very important" by sixteen percent; "somewhat im-
portant" by forty-six percent.
41 Eighteen percent described this as "very important"; forty-two percent as
"somewhat important."
49 Twelve judges participated in follow-up interviews. We were particularly in-
terested in judicial attitudes toward parental access to interview disclosures. In the
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to parents or attorneys what the child said in chambers. If parents'
attorneys were present, some judges instructed them not to talk to
their clients. This might create an uncomfortable situation for the
attorney, particularly if the child provides evidence regarding the
parents. One judge even reported ordering the child, attorneys, and
parents not to discuss the interview. Many judges apparently be-
lieved that the child should be assured that she may confide in the
judge without fearing that parents will learn of the disclosures.
Judges varied in their concern about the impact of evidence re-
garding the parents offered by the child in a confidential interview.
When asked what their response would be to a damaging new dis-
closure about a parent, some judges said they would stop the in-
terview; others would confront the parent; other responses included
initiating a social service investigation, directing the guardian ad
litem to look into the matter, and ignoring the disclosure. These
responses suggest that it may be difficult to protect both the child's
confidentiality and the right of parents to hear and confront evi-
dence.
Judges generally believed that most children either want to express
a preference 0 or are reluctantly willing to do so." Many judges
believed that the primary reason that a child might be reluctant to
express a preference was a desire not to injure or alienate either
parent, not the absence of a preference. A majority of judges stated
that children felt pressured by parents to express a preference, and
many judges were concerned that they not add to that pressure.
Many judges 2 never asked younger children directly about their
preferences. Rather, the majority, if they interviewed younger chil-
dren at all, typically attempted to discern preference through indirect
questions or through the child's unsolicited comments." However,
almost one-third of the judges asked older children directly about
initial survey, only twelve percent reported that they recorded the inteniew and




-1 Indirect inquiries might include such questions as which parent should sit next
to the child on a long trip, which parent would the child want with her on a
desert island (if allowed to only bring one), and which parent would rescue the
child at the end of an imaginary adventure.
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their preference. In general, the interview may be characterized as
an opportunity for the child to offer a preference (with some en-
couragement) rather than a direct inquiry.
B. Factors Influencing the Weight Given the Child's Preference
The judges were asked about factors influencing the weight given
the child's preference. As we predicted, the child's age was a critical
variable. Nearly ninety percent of the judges surveyed reported that
the preference of children aged fourteen and older was either dis-
positive (absent unusual circumstances) or extremely important.5 4 The
wishes of children aged ten to thirteen were accorded somewhat less
weight and the preferences of younger children were discounted
significantly.5 In general, there was a clear correlation between the
age of the child and the weight given her preference.
The reason most frequently offered for crediting the older child's
preference was that, practically, adolescents have the freedom to as-
sociate with the parent of choice. The judges also expressed the
view that the preferences of older children were more intense than
those of younger children. A majority recognized the greater ma-
turity of adolescents and a substantial proportion acknowledged re-
spect for older children's preferences because they are "almost adults
and have a right to a significant voice.' ' Most judges rejected the
notion that older children would be less subject to parental influence
as a reason to give greater weight to their preferences.
Of the reasons that children may give for preferring one parent
over another, the two most frequently offered by older children
included continuity with home, school, and friends3 7 and dislike of
one parent's new partner. 8 One might postulate that children may
14 Twenty-two percent described the preference of children 14 years or older as
dispositive; sixty-seven percent as extremely important.
" For ten- to thirteen-year-olds, fifty-four percent of judges rated their prefer-
ence as extremely important, and forty-two percent somewhat important. For six-
to nine-year-olds, seventy-six percent rated the child's preferences as somewhat
important, sixteen percent as not important.
16 This basis for deferring to the child's wishes-the recognition of the legitimate
interest that older children may have in self-determination-is a central thesis of
children's rights advocates. Less than one-half of the judges (forty-three percent)





find these reasons more palatable and less hurtful to the non-chosen
parent than reasons which may seem more obvious to a lay ob-
server-a closer relationship with one parent59 or a historically hos-
tile and distant relationship with the non-chosen parent.w0 Also, judges
suggested that children often chose the parent who offered more
freedom and less discipline, 61 a reason which many judges did not
find worthy of consideration.62
The judges were divided in their response to proposed statutory
changes that would guide or limit judicial discretion. Thirty-seven
percent of respondents would approve a statutory amendment di-
Grecting courts to consider the child's preference. Judicial attitudes
were also divided about the desirability of a statutory presumption
that the older child's custodial preference be respected. More than
one-third of the judges were opposed 63 to such a provision, while
thirty-six percent favored (fourteen percent strongly) one. Of those
who favored such a rule, all thought it should apply to children
sixteen and older, and two-thirds to children over thirteen. Thus,
although in practice deferential to the wishes of older children,
many judges were opposed to limits of judicial discretion.
C. Testimony in Court: Judicial Attitudes and Practices
One objection to involving children in custody litigation is that
they might be called upon by one parent to testify in open court, a
prospect that many assume would be harmful. 6' Many judges reported
that children either never or infrequently were called upon to testify
in court in custody cases. 65 The majority believed that this would
be harmful to the child6 and expressed opposition to the practice. 6
A minority of judges were neutral or favorable to attorneys calling




- Forty-four percent of judges gave this response.
61 Twenty-three percent strongly; fourteen percent mildly.
64 See Jones, supra note 1, at 74; Comment, supra note 27, at 559-60.
0 Twelve percent of judges reported that children never testify; forty-five percent
reported that testimony was "infrequent."
66 Twenty-one percent always; thirty percent sometimes.
Thirty-three percent, strong opposition; twenty-one percent, mild opposition.
68 Twenty-three percent neutral; four percent favorable.
Sixty-two percent.
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discourage an attorney from seeking to call the child as a witness;
several explicitly acknowledged a willingness to exert pressure should
the issue arise. This may be effective discouragement since attorneys
in custody cases may be peculiarly responsive to judicial pressure.
Since the legal standard is vague, few decisions will be overruled;
thus, antagonizing the trial judge may be imprudent.
Despite general disapproval of children as witnesses in this con-
text, most judges70 reported that they would allow testimony by
children if an attorney insisted. This reflects the traditional judicial
posture toward the introduction of relevant evidence by parties. If
a child has relevant evidence to offer other than custodial prefer-'
ence, an in-chambers interview may not be an adequate mechanism.
Also, the party against whom the evidence is offered has an interest
in, and arguably a right to hear the evidence, to cross-examine the
child, and to refute the evidence.
D. Summary and Analysis
The survey results suggest that many judges in Virginia consult
with children about their wishes regarding custody and that the
preferences of adolescents are extremely important to the decision.
Although Virginia law, unlike that in many states, does not direct
the court to consider the child's wishes, judges uniformly reported
that preference of adolescents is an important and often the dom-
inant consideration in resolving disputes about their custody.
Most judges were opposed to open court testimony by children
in custody proceedings, generally preferring to learn of the child's
preference through a brief, private in-chambers interview. The judges
reported that the interview usually lasted less than fifteen minutes;
thus, a probing inquiry into the child's motivation, ambivalence, or
sense of coercion about the expressed custody preference rarely oc-
curred. Rather, a child who has a preference regarding custody may
make her wishes known, and, at least with some judges, may be
assured that these disclosures will not be reported to either parent.
Judges also use the in-chambers interview to form an impression of





III. THE [MPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY: REGULATING THE CHILD'S
ROLE IN THE PROCEEDING
Judges in Virginia followed an implicit rule regarding the rele-
vance of the child's preference in custody proceedings despite the
absence of any statutory guidance. They also generally followed
implicit procedural guidelines for obtaining evidence regarding the
child's preference.7 In this Part, we analyze the implications for
legal policy that may be derived from the findings of the study.
First, we examine the procedural problems created by a decision to
involve the child in the custody proceeding. We argue that although
the practice of obtaining input from the child through a brief,
private interview seems inadequate from the perspective of both
parents and children, in fact, it may represent the best accommo-
dation of the conflicting interests of parents and children in this
context, particularly if the opportunity to have a voice in the de-
cision is limited to adolescents.
Second, the implicit substantive rule followed by the surveyed
judges-deferring generally to the custodial preferences of adoles-
cents but not of young children-has much to recommend it. An
adolescent preference rule encourages judicial restraint in the exer-
cise of paternalistic decision making authority over families, because
courts applying the rule will tend to defer to a family member (the
adolescent) as decision maker. It indirectly encourages private or-
dering of some custody disputes since parents will be influenced by
the rule to follow the preferences of teenagers rather than to litigate
custody3n Further, recognizing the interests of adolescents in having
a voice in decisions affecting their lives is consistent with the recent
7' Most judges, without legal guidance, interview older children briefly in cham-
bers. There is variation about which participants are allowed to be present, whether
notes are taken, etc. See Jones, supra note 1, at 80-84. Professor Jones believes
that judicial interviews should not be recorded, but that notes taken during the
interview for judges' own reference are acceptable.
For an insightful analysis of the impact of the substantive legal rules on the
bargaining behavior of parties negotiating a divorce agreement, see Mnookin &
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YA.E
L.J. 950 (1979). On the issue of custody of an adolescent, the preference rule may
affect strategic bargaining, giving a "chip" to the preferred parent. Id. at 966-68.
This effect may not be particularly costly, however, if the legal rule is supported
by a social norm favoring adolescent choice.
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trend toward expanded recognition of adolescents' interest in decision
making. 73 Finally, child development research suggests that it may be
appropriate to distinguish between adolescents and younger children
in fashioning a preference rule.
A. Obtaining Evidence Regarding the Child's Preference
The problem confronting courts seeking to hear directly from the
child in custody disputes may be simply stated. If judges use a
brief, in-chambers interview to obtain information from the child,
as most prefer to do, they may be criticized on two grounds. First,
critics concerned with the rights of parents as litigants focus on the
perceived due process problems inherent in an informal, private
interview of the child in which the judge may hear evidence not
known to the affected party. 74 A quite different objection focuses
on the inadequacy of a brief interview as a means of ascertaining
a child's "real preferences." 75
However, alternatives to the brief, private interview are also prob-
lematic. If the court defers to the parents' interest in responding to
all evidence (by requiring the child to testify in court or by allowing
parties or their attorneys to participate in the in-chambers inter-
view), then the child may endure significant stress in confronting
the rejected parent and in being subjected to cross-examination. If
the court responds to the criticism of superficiality by attempting
to undertake a probing inquiry about the child's preferences during
a private interview, evidence not heard by the parties may be dis-
closed by the child. The challenge for the law is to protect parents
from "secret" evidence while at the same time allowing the child
to express his or her real preference to the judge in the least stress-
ful way possible.7 6
71 See supra note 71; see generally F. ZIMIUNG, supra note 10. This has been
particularly true of issues in which according legal rights to teenagers also promotes
their welfare. In this category may be the right to obtain contraceptives or to
consent to substance abuse or mental health treatment. Id. at 7-11, 112.
"I See Lombard, supra note 3, at 820; Jones, supra note 1, at 55. Professor
Jones asserts that the due process rights of parents are affected if the child's
questioning is not recorded because the parents have no opportunity to respond.
11 Newman & Collester, supra note 18, at 11 (proposing interview of one-half
to one hour).
76 Also at stake is the state's independent interest in custody cases both in




1. The Accuracy of the Interview. Critics suggest that brief ju-
dicial interviews are an inadequate basis for learning the child's
"true" preference in a custody dispute. Our study indicates that
judges are aware that children may have many reasons for express-
ing a preference regarding custody. The child may have a long-
term, closer relationship with the preferred parent, a distant or
hostile relationship with the non-chosen parent, a hostility toward
a parent's new mate or, most commonly, a preference for the con-
tinuity of home, school, and friends. Some critics assert children
may sometimes express a custodial preference that may not be in
their "best interest" or that may not reflect their "true," or at
least long-term, preference.
Decision theory would suggest that children at the time of divorce
may be influenced by short-term cognitive and emotional biases that
potentially distort the decision making process.' Decision makers
tend to weigh heavily data that is vivid or directly related to im-
mediate experience and to undervalue abstract or remote informa-
tion.78 The context of divorce may lead younger children particularly
to weigh heavily the loss of the absent parent or to be heavily
influenced by transitory anger at the "guilty" parent." Moreover, the
"week-end" parent who entertains the child and imposes few rules may
seem more attractive than the parent associated with the school
week routine. Choices may be affected by sympathy for the parent
who has been left by the other or for the parent who has not been
chosen by the other children.
- The effect of cognitive biases on decision making has been the subject of
extensive social science research in recent years. Kahnemann and Tversky have
described several heuristics used by decision makers in making inferences and as-
sessing probabilities. These heuristics are useful ways of organizing large amounts
of data, but they may sometimes bias decision making. Kahnemann & Tversky,
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEuusIcs AND BiAsEs (D. Kahnemann, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky
eds. 1982).
78 This bias in decision making is called availability heuristic. Id. at 11. An
example is the individual whose Volvo automobile suffers frequent repair problems.
In evaluating the merits of Volvos, she is likely to be influenced by this fact as
much as, or more than, contrary consumer report evaluations.
79 Wallerstein and Kelly, in a longitudinal study of the impact of divorce on
children, found that these responses were typical of children in the age nine to
twelve category. See J. VALLERSTEiN & J. KELLY, SURVMNG THE BREAK Up (1980).
This would argue for not weighing heavily the preferences of children in this age
group.
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Even if such biases and motivations could be revealed through
skillful probing inquiry, judges generally do not attempt to under-
take such an examination and probably do not have the professional
skills to do so. s° However, if preference is to count in the legal
decision, utilizing mental health professionals to interpret ambiguous
signals from the child is also questionable. Despite claims to the
contrary,8' mental health expertise to undertake such a murky in-
quiry has not been demonstrated . 2
Another source of error may be the reluctance of some judges
to inquire directly about the child's preference because of the
(empirically unsupported) assumption that a direct question regard-
ing the preferred custodian will be painful to the child. The survey
results suggest that some judges believe they can accurately infer
preference from a child's answers to other questions about his or
her parents and their relationship.8 3 The problem with this approach
is that it may lead to error as frequently as accepting the child's
stated preference on its face.
The problems presented by critics of the brief interview may be
more relevant to inquiries of younger children than adolescents.
First, the biases that may distort the expression of a choice may
influence decision making of teenagers less than that of younger
children. Second, judicial evaluation of the rationale for the preference
See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREuD, J. SOLNIT & S. GOLDSTEIN, IN Tim BEST IN-
TERESTS OF THE CHILD (1986) (arguing that professionals involved in legal decision
making about children (attorneys, judges, mental health professionals) may often
step beyond the boundaries of their professional competence and assume dual (and
often conflicting) roles).
11 Alan Levy asserted that the task of mental health professionals in this context
"is to interpret the child's statement and to examine its relationship to the various
factors affecting its development. Conscious and unconscious levels of meaning
must be considered." Levy, The Meaning of the Child's Preference in Child Curs-
tody Determinations, 8 J. PsYcHATRY & L. 218, 223 (1980). This would seem to
be an amorphous inquiry and a questionable basis for judicial opinion. For a
critical view of clinical input by mental health professionals involving children, see
Melton, Shrinking the Power of the Expert's Word, 9(5) FAM. ADVOCATE 22 (1986).
12 Moreover, judicial evaluation of the merits of the preference is also trouble-
some.




of the adolescent may be less justified. Finally, direct inquiry
about the adolescent's preferences is probably more appropriate-at
least judges are more ready to ask teenagers directly about their
wishes.
2. The Protection of Parents' Rights. Related to the uncertainty
about the effectiveness of a probing inquiry of the child's preference
is the concern about revelations that such an inquiry may produce.
The more the judge questions the child and seeks to obtain infor-
mation about the source of her feelings about each parent, the more
likely it is that the court will hear evidence that may not have been
disclosed by the adversely affected party. Thus, any benefit obtained
by broadening or deepening the judicial inquiry is purchased directly
at the expense of judicial fairness to the affected parent.4 Given
the questionable benefit, the cost may not be justified.
Although supporters of an in-depth interview of the child gener-
ally also recognize the need to protect parents' rights," the methods
suggested to provide this safeguard are generally unsatisfactory.
Courts could permit the parents' attorneys to be present at the
interview and to cross-examine the child. This would change the
character of the interview, however, and possibly reduce its benefit
in providing a low-stress setting for the child to reveal custodial
preferences.8 6 Although some judges in our study allowed attorneys
to be present, few would permit parents' attorneys to take an active
14 This is not true, of course, if the child's disclosures are revealed to the parties,
who are allowed to cross-examine the child and refute harmful statements made
by the child. Indeed, some courts have required that a record be made of the
interview or that the parties' attorneys be present, so that the parents may have
access to all evidence presented by the child. See Watermeier v. Watermeier, 462
So. 2d 1272 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 464 So. 2d 310 (La. 1985). This response,
however, has its own costs in terms of potentially heightened stress for the child.
81 See Comment, supra note 27, at 571-78 (arguing that due process rights can
be protected by a verbatim record of the interview).
Another alternative is to provide a record of the interview to the parties and
their attorneys. This offers parents access to the child's statement, but the right
of cross-examination is lost and the evidence can be confronted only indirectly.
From the child's perspective, the interview itself may be less stressful than if
attorneys were present, but the child may be inhibited by the knowledge that her
disclosures will be revealed to the parents. Such a record is required in several
states. See, e.g., CoLo. Rnv. STAT. § 14-10-126(1) (1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 724(a) (1981) (the court may interview a child in chambers and may permit
presence of counsel, but the court shall, at the request of the parties, make a
record of the interview).
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role. Some would not allow them to discuss the child's disclosures
with their clients.
Our study results suggest that many judges believed that children
want to talk to them alone. Children feel pressured by their parents
and inhibited when parties' attorneys are present. There is no direct
empirical evidence about whether children value confidentiality in
expressing their preferences about custody to judges. Some children
may not care and may even want to express their wishes directly
to their parents; 7 others may experience anxiety about invoking
parental anger and disappointment if their statements are disclosed,
and may only express their wishes candidly if confidentiality is as-
sured. In terms of the child's interest., there is little to be gained
by a mandatory disclosure rule. Those children who want to reveal
their preferences to their parents can do so themselves; others may
benefit from assurances of confidentiality.8 s
The problem of protecting both children and parents may be
manageable if two safeguards are followed. First, the in-chambers
interview of the child should be restricted to the limited purpose of
obtaining the child's preference. Although cognitive biases, intra-
psychic influences, or even overt coercion by a parent may distort
the child's expression, it is not clear that a probing interview will
enhance accurate judicial understanding of the child's preference 9
The private, in-chambers interview of the child is not an appropriate
forum for the production of substantive evidence about parental
behavior. Testimony in court by the parties, their witnesses, or
court-appointed mental health professionals provides the protection
required by due process.20
87 Melton & Lind, supra note 13. Drawing on social psychology research by
Thibaut and Walker that suggests that litigants derive satisfaction from participating
in adversary proceedings, Melton and Lind argue that children may benefit from
the opportunity to advocate openly for their custodial preferences.
11 The guardian ad litem may have an important role in informing and advising
his or her adolescent client regarding the availability and purpose of the interview
with the judge, its confidential nature, and its limited purpose. See Landsman &
Minow, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and
Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 YAmE L.J. 1126, 1137-38 (1978) (a
child's interests are significantly affected by the custody suit, thereby requiring legal
representation that is separate from the parents). The child who has a preference
may be urged to use the opportunity to make his or her wishes known.
89 Moreover, it is unclear that there is any objective referent against which to
measure the validity of preferences under any circumstances.
" If the child is the only source of important evidence, testimony in court may
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A second safeguard is to limit the judicial inquiry to adolescents
about custodial preferences. Adolescents are arguably less vulnerable
and better able to express their actual desires than younger chil-
dren.9' Furthermore, direct questioning is likely to be less subject
to errors in assessment than indirect inquiries.
Most judges in our study did not favor testimony in open court
by children in custody cases. The assumption is that many children
find formal testimony stressful, particularly when it requires the
rejection of one parent in a face to face situation. Melton and
Lind92 have challenged the generally-held assumption that testifying
in court is harmful to children; they point out that this conclusion
is unsubstantiated and is inconsistent with the findings of Thibaut's
and Walker's social psychology research studies showing satisfaction
be required. At a minimum, the court may require some mechanism by which the
child's evidence may be subject to cross-examination and refutation by the parties.
The guardian ad litem, through conversations with the child, may also determine
whether the child has substantive evidence to offer which should be presented
through more formal channels.
Judges will not likely want to restrict artificially the child's disclosures. If the
child talks about issues that have previously been introduced into evidence, little
harm is done. However, the child should be aware that if he or she talks about
the parent and provides information which has not been previously disclosed, the
judge may provide that information to the parties and their attorneys. If judicial
interviews usually involve adolescents, or younger children who affirmatively indi-
cate a desire to disclose a preference, there should seldom be misunderstanding of
the purpose of interviews; both children and parents may be protected.
9' Susan Scott-Meehan studied the involvement of a group of children, aged 9
to 12, in custody litigation. She found that many experienced loyalty conflicts and
pressure to express a preference which, at least for some children, was unwelcome.
S. Scott-Meehan, Child Custody Disputes: The Experience of Children and the
Implications for Social Policy (unpublished dissertation available at Stanford Uni-
versity, 1982). Adolescents may be somewhat less likely to experience loyalty con-
flicts than younger children. Cf. J. WATLERSTEn & J. KELLY, supra note 79.
Further, since they may be less suggestible to adult authority figures, they may be
less vulnerable to coercion. Scherer and Reppucci found that adolescents were less
vulnerable to parental suggestion when confronted with important treatment issues
than when decisions were trivial. Scherer & Reppucci, Adolescents' Capabilities to
Provide Voluntary Informed Consent: The Effects of Parental Influence and Med-
ical Dilemmas, 12 LAWv & HUtzAN BEHAv. 123 (1988). See also Melton, Children's
Competency to Testify, 5 LAW & HuutAN BERAV. 73 (1981) (suggestibility to adult
authority figures decreases as children grow older). Adolescents evidence less tran-
sitory anger at the parent responsible for the family dissolution and less tendency
to feel inconsolable loss at the absence of a parent. See J. WA.u.nnsTm & J.
KELLY, supra note 79.
'- See Melton & Lind, supra note 14.
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of parties from adversary proceedings. 93 However, the child's posi-
tion in a custody adjudication may be very different from responses
of college students in simulated adversarial disputes, and thus the
application of these research findings is unclear. Until further re-
search on children's experience in custody disputes is available, it
is plausible to assume that some, if not most, children would prefer
not to face their parents in court to express their preference for
one of them. Further, it is reasonable to hypothesize that such
testimony may have a negative impact on the relationship between
the child and the non-chosen parent.
If children are permitted to express their preferences in a private
interview, testimony by a child is only necessary if the child has
substantive evidence to offer which is unavailable from other sources.
In this situation, fairness to the parties requires that evidence be
taken through testimony in court and be subject to examination and
cross-examination. It would seem likely that in most cases evidence
from the parties and their witnesses, together with that offered by
the guardian ad litem, would obviate the need for testimony by the
child.
B. Devising a Substantive Decision Rule
The larger decisional role given adolescents in disputes over cus-
tody in recent years reflects two trends in family law. First, it
comports with the search for more determinate decision rules that
promote private ordering of decisions around divorce.Y Second, it
91 See J. THIBAUT & L. VALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOoIcAL ANAL-
Ysis (1975) (concluding that adversary proceedings are favored because evidentiary control
is largely in the hands of the disputants).
14 Much has been written about the costs of applying the indeterminate best
interest of the child standard, the current dominant decision rule in resolving
custody disputes. The standard requires both a prediction which is difficult or
impossible to make-what will be the effect on the child of being in the custody
of each parent-and a value judgment about the meaning of "best interests." The
standard invites litigation, a particularly costly course in this context, and may
increase hostility between parties whose cooperation after the divorce would prob-
ably be beneficial to the child. See generally Mnookin, supra note 13. Many
observers have concluded that the costs of custody disputes are reduced and the
results more satisfactory to all participants if the parties reach an agreement about
custody themselves. Thus, proposals that reduce the probability of litigation (such
as mediation) have been embraced. See Scott & Emery, Child Custody Dispute
Resolution: The Adversarial System and Divorce Mediation, in L. WITHORN, PSY-
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reflects an emerging "jurisprudence of adolescence," the central
theme of which is that adolescents should be given some autonomy
in the transition to legal adulthood. 9
1. Child Preference Rule and Private Ordering. In recent years,
the law has increasingly authorized and indeed encouraged couples
contemplating divorce to resolve their disputes without submitting
to litigation. With the advent of no-fault divorce, couples for the
first time could legitimately present a divorce agreement to a court
and have that agreement ratified. 96 In contrast to the response of
courts in an earlier era, courts today are receptive to pre-divorce
and even pre-marital agreements resolving property and support is-
sues.f Although courts theoretically retain a supervisory interest in
custody arrangements agreed upon by the parents, custody agreements
CHOLOGY AND CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS: KNOWLEDGE, ROLES, AND Ex-
PERTISE 23 (1987). Dissatisfaction with the best interest standard has contributed to
interest in joint custody. A rule preferring joint custody would encourage parties
to agree to this arrangement. For a critique of a custody decision rule favoring
joint custody, see Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 13, at 469.
91 The law traditionally recognized a "bright line" between minority and ma-
jority. Children, whether toddlers or teenagers, were presumed incompetent and
were subject to the legal authority of their parents or the state in every realm.
This uniformly paternalistic stance toward children began to weaken in the 1960s;
a milestone was the Supreme Court's opinion in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967),
according minors the right to an attorney and other adult procedural rights when
they face delinquency charges. See generally supra note 10.
'1 Under "fault" divorce laws, no divorce could be granted unless one party
proved that the other was at fault. Thus, divorce could not be obtained by agree-
ment between the parties. This often led to collusion between parties when both
wanted the divorce. See generally Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Wl'ithout
Perjury, 52 VA. L. REv. 32 (1966). Divorce by agreement came with the "no
fault" era.
- Many states follow the policy of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act,
directing courts to ratify the separation agreement of the parties unless unconscion-
able. See UNmF. MARRiAGE & DIVORCE AcT § 306, 9A U.L.A. 216 (1987). Sce also
N.Y. Doff. REL. LAW § 236(3) (McKinney 1986). Antenuptial agreements may be
subject to greater scrutiny but provisions regarding property are increasingly rati-
fied. See Umri. PRnhtAR. AGREEmENT ACT § 3, 9B U.L.A. 369 (1983) (requiring
enforcement of premarital agreements regarding disposition of property and pro-
viding spousal support in most circumstances).
9 State law directing courts to ratify property agreements between parties (absent
unconscionability) exclude custody agreements from this mandatory directive. See
N.Y. Doza. REL. LAW § 236(4) (McKinney 1986). Further, custody agreements are
subject to court modification based on "changed circumstances" throughout the
child's minority. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108 (Supp. 1988).
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typically receive judicial ratification with little examination. This
trend reflects in part a pessimism about the capability of courts to
make better decisions for families facing divorce than couples can
make themselves. Parties may accept a custody arrangement to
which they voluntarily agreed more readily than one imposed by a
court. 99 The trend toward private ordering also recognizes the ex-
traordinary psychological and economic costs of litigation around
divorce. The use of adversary proceedings to reach outcomes in
custody disputes is extremely costly and often inimical to the best
interest of the child.10°
At first glance, it would seem that a custody rule deferring to
the adolescent child's preference would have little to do with the
private ordering trend; here the parents have failed to privately
resolve their dispute. However, when a court defers to the child's
wishes regarding custody, the child is the substitute for the legally
preferred private decision makers-the parents-who are disqualified
because they cannot agree. The rationale for preferring private or-
dering over judicially imposed outcomes operates here; the custody
arrangement chosen by the adolescent child is most likely to be
workable because it will be satisfactory to the child.' 0'
A second objective of private ordering is achieved by recognizing
the child's preference. A rule directing courts to defer to the wishes
of adolescents will affect parties' bargaining in the shadow of that
rule upon divorce. Parents will be less likely to contest the custody
of their adolescent children and more likely to defer to the child's
wishes. Thus all family members may benefit because litigation of
custody matters is discouraged.102
This result may occur even in a state like Virginia without an
announced legal rule. 03 Judges reported that the majority of custody
99 This psychological assumption supports divorce mediation as a dispute reso-
lution mechanism. See Scott & Emery, supra note 94.
100 See id.; Mnookin, supra note 13, at 249-55.
10, Of course, one party will also be satisfied.
102 See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 72. In part, this is simply the result
of replacing a broad standard with a clear rule. If the outcome of litigation is
evident to the parties because the rule directs a result, the party unlikely to succeed
in the litigation has less incentive to litigate.
20 Our study suggests that an explicit statutory rule may not be needed since
judges follow an implicit child's preference rule without statutory guidance, How-
ever, unless there are significant costs involved in announcing an explicit rule, it
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disputes involved younger children. The smaller number of disputes
involving adolescents may have several possible explanations. First,
it may in part reflect the demographics of divorce. Couples with
young children may be more likely to divorce than those whose
marriages have endured long enough to have teenagers. Second,
parties may bargain in the shadow of the implicit decision rule
recognizing the adolescent's custody wishes. For example, attorneys
may advise their clients that seeking custody when a teenager wishes
to be with the other parent is not likely to be successful. An al-
ternative explanation, which will be explored further in Part IV, is
that social norms may guide parents to respect their children's wishes
regarding custody. Independently of their knowledge of legal rules,
parents may believe that teenagers who have a preference have a
right to a voice about their custody or that defying a child's wishes
will be either costly or fruitless. Whatever the explanation, it is
plausible that custody of adolescents may be less frequently litigated
because children, in fact, have a voice in the decision within the
family.
A legal presumption favoring the custodial preferences of adoles-
cents is a clear rule-a rule that lends greater certainty to this
category of custody disputes. In general, clear rules have lower
application costs than broad standards that incorporate many vari-
ables. The indeterminate best interest of the child standard has been
much criticized as a custody decision rule because of its substantial
application costs.' °4 Lending certainty to a category of custody cases
through the use of an easily applied rule is a positive achievement,
as long as the outcome directed by the rule comports with the
overall legal objective: a custody decision that reflects the best
would seem desirable to do so, as it would enhance certainty and predictability in
decision making. A child's preference rule will not discourage litigation in all
potentially applicable cases; another response by one of the parties is possible. A
parent who is not preferred or who is uncertain about the child's choice may put
pressure on the child not to express a preference. See supra note 13.
1o1 In contrast, the tender years presumption that preceded the best interest stan-
dard as the dominant custody decision rule was easily applied and promoted pre-
dictability, as it incorporated fewer variables. Despite lower application costs, the
tender years presumption became less satisfactory when maternal custody was less
clearly the correct outcome. In other words, the rule less accurately mirrored the
overall objective of the law. See Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 13, at 446.
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interest of the child. 10 5 To measure the substantive merits of an ad-
olescent preference rule, it may be useful to examine such a
presumption in the context of evolving legal policy toward minors.
2. The Growing Case for a "'Rebuttable Presumption of Lib-
erty.'10 The growing recognition of a role for children in custody
decisions reflects society's perception that the line between minority
and majority status is no longer a bright one. The traditional legal
stance of withholding any decision making authority from minors
was based in part on the unexamined premise that minors of any
age were incapable of participating in important decisions affecting
their lives and that their welfare required that they be subject to
parental and state authority. This stance has been somewhat mod-
ified over the past twenty years. The law increasingly gives minors
the liberty to make decisions which directly or indirectly restrict the
authority of their parents and the state. Paradoxically, expanded
legal rights of adolescents are supported and constrained by pater-
nalistic as well as libertarian goals. Thus, minors may seek treatment
for drug or alcohol abuse, but may not purchase alcohol.'0 7 They
,05 Since this objective is by its nature paternalistic, it may in fact not be fully
satisfactory as applied to adolescents. This, together with the difficulty in defining
the best interest standard, since it is a value-based construction, may argue for a
recasting of the legal objective when adolescents' custody is at issue. Perhaps the
goal is better defined as the outcome most satisfactory to the teenager unless clearly
harmful to her welfare. See infra note 118.
- This phrase was coined by Zimring, see supra note 10, at 52.
307 Access to contraceptives surely has as much to do with the paternalistic
objective of protecting against the high cost of teenage pregnancy as with "repro.
ductive autonomy." Scott, Adolescent Reproductive Rights: Abortion, Contracep-
tion, and Sterilization, in CILDREN, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAw 125, 137-39
(N.D. Reppucci, L. Weithorn, E. Mulvey, & J. Monahan eds. 1983). Thus, there
is no inconsistency in legal policy that restricts the access of minors to alcohol or
pornography, but treats them as adults for the purpose of consenting to certain
kinds of medical treatment.
Many states have laws designating types of medical treatment that minors may
seek without parental consent. These include drug and alcohol treatment, treatment
for venereal disease, and outpatient mental health treatment. The underlying policy
is to encourage minors to seek treatment that is important to their health and that
they would be less inclined to seek if they were required to involve their parents.
See VA. CODE ANN. §54-325.2 (Supp. 1988) (a minor is deemed an adult, for the
purpose of consenting to medical services with respect to birth control, pregnancy,
substance abuse, mental illness, or emotional disturbances). Many states also have
general "mature minor" provisions that authorize physicians to treat minors with-
out parental consent (and without fear of liability). See Wadlington, Minors and
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may exercise first amendment free speech rights in schools as long
as it does not interfere with educational objectives.10s
Franklin Zimring has offered a thoughtful analysis of the appro-
priate legal response toward adolescents in modern society, suggest-
ing that the law treat adolescents as though they have a "learner's
permit" for adult life. 1o9 Zimring argues that teenagers should be
given as much freedom to learn to make their own choices as they
can handle without excessive or lasting destructive effects. Adoles-
cents are approaching a complex modern world and may benefit
from experience with adult liberties and responsibilities while they
remain in a protected status." 0
The question arises whether some standard of competency should
be applied to children's custodial preferences. On other issues such
as medical decision making, legal authority of minors is premised
on a finding (or presumption) of competency. A cognitive compe-
tency requirement is appropriate for medical decisions because of
the requirement of informed consent."' Decisions about custody do
Health Care: The Age of Consent, 11 OS-OODE HALL L.J. 115 (1973) (discussing
the mature minor rule and minor's authority to consent to treatment in particular
situations).
10 The Supreme Court announced in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Com-
munity School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969), that "it can hardly be argued
that ... students . .. shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate." Nevertheless, it has since become clear that
schools may restrict student expression in a way that would be unacceptable for
adults if it is vulgar or implicates curricular purposes. See Bethel School Dist. No.
403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680-86 (1986) (holding that school officials acted
within authority in suspending student who made off color campaign speech);
Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988) (holding that prior
restraint and censorship of school newspaper does not violate students' first amend-
ment rights because official supervision implicated curriculum objectives).
109 See F. ZumuNo, supra note 10.
110 Id. at 89-98. In Zimring's view, adolescents should be protected from the full
burden of adult responsibilities, but should have some experience of adult decision
making freedom and accountability.
-' See Roth, Meisel, & Lidz, Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment,
134 Ai i. J. PSYCmATRY 279 (1977) (description of various tests of competency to
consent to treatment, including: (1) evidencing a choice; (2) "reasonable" outcome
of choice; (3) choice based on "rational" reasons; (4) ability to understand; and
(5) actual understanding); Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doc-
trine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decision-Making,
1979 Wis. L. REv. 413, 433-86 (examining the exceptions to the requirement of
informed consent (emergencies, incompetent patients, waiver) as a vehicle for an-
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not fit as neatly into the competency construct because of the im-
portant emotional component. Nonetheless, although requirements
of competency have not been legally defined in this context, judicial
pronouncements and statutory provisions regarding children's pre-
ferences are phrased in terms of cognitive decision making capabil-
ity. For example, a California statute directs the court to consider
the child's preference "if a child is of sufficient age and capacity
to reason so as to form an intelligent preference as to custody." 2
Thus, the analogue to other cognitive decision making tasks may
be relevant.
Lois Weithorn conducted research comparing the decision making
of adults and minors concerning medical treatment."' She found
that, in contrast to nine-year-olds, fourteen-year-olds reasoned about
medical decisions in much the same way that the adults did. These
findings are consistent with cognitive development theory that
predicts that by the age of fourteen, minors reach a stage of formal
operational thinking that allows them to think hypothetically."'
alyzing the tension underlying legal policy in this context between promoting self
determination and health). Minors, unlike adults, were traditionally presumed to
be incompetent to make medical decisions. Since informed consent is a prerequisite
to medical treatment (which would otherwise be a battery), parents have legal
authority to consent to medical treatment for their children. In recent years, re-
searchers have challenged the presumed incompetency of minors in this context.
See Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 11, at 1589. This may have contributed to
changed policies regarding minors' consent to treatment in recent years. See Wad-
lington, supra note 107, at 117, 121.
2 CAL. CrV. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1988).
-' Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 11, at 1589.
"" Under a Piagetian model of cognitive development, children reach the highest
stage of cognitive development, which involves the capacity to engage in formal
operational thinking, between the ages of twelve and fourteen. Id. at 1590-91.
Modern research in cognitive development has challenged Piaget's stage theory and
suggests that the development of operational skills does not progress in stages and
may vary in a given individual depending on the task. See Byrnes, Formal Oper-
ations: A Systematic Reformulation, 8 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 66, 66-67 (1988) (the
decline in interest in the formal operations model can be linked to the shift away
from Piagetian theory toward views of conceptual development which explain age
differences through domain specificity and the acquisition of expertise); Siegler,
Developmental Sequences Within and Between Concepts, 46 MONOORAPHS OF T13
Soc'Y FOR Rns. IN CHILD DEV. (1981) (children's reasoning across different concepts
is less consistent than expected on the basis of the Piagetian theory).
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Using the analogy of competency to make medical decisions, Wei-
thorn has suggested a line of inquiry that may be useful in assessing
competency for custody decision making. Under this method,
competency would involve an understanding of the custody decision
and its implications, as well as an ability to weigh the short- and
long-term consequences of each alternative. Most adolescents are
likely to be found competent by this standard.' 5
Another requirement of informed decision making that is relevant
to custody cases is voluntariness." 6 The child's wishes about custody
should be independent and not a product of parental coercion. A
legal rule focusing on the child's preference may encourage coercive
maneuvers by parents. Such maneuvering would be costly if the
preference of younger children were legally important,"' but ado-
lescents are likely more independent of their parents and also ar-
guably less vulnerable to parental coercion." '8
There are also persuasive philosophical and practical grounds for
recognizing the preferences of adolescents. Teenagers are only a few
years away from adulthood and have a claim to respect for their
interest in self-determination. A paternalistic judicial determination
that the child's best interest is served by a custody decision that
the child affirmatively opposes, violates her interest in autonomy
and imposes the judge's values on the child. 19 On more practical
grounds, adolescents who are placed with a parent with whom they
1 See Weithorn, Children's Capacities in Legal Conte.ts, in CHILDEN, MENTAL
HEALTH, AND T LAW, supra note 107, at 25, 42-45. The appreciation standard
of informed consent to medical decisions requires that the decision maker be
capable of understanding the described procedures, consequences, risks and ben-
efits, and comparing it to alternatives including no treatment.
116 See Meisel, supra note 111, at 457.
"I Judges in our survey reported that they believed that children feel pressure
from parents. The more emphasis courts give to the child's preference in the deci-
sion, the more incentive each parent may have to win the child's support for his
or her custody claim. Scott-Meehan found in her study that children aged 9 to 12
experience pressure from their parents (and from courts) to state a preference.
See S. Scott-Meehan, supra note 91.
I'8 Scherer and Reppucci recently studied 14-year-old adolescents' responses to a
series of medical decision making vignettes. They found that the adolescents were
less likely to be influenced by parental preference when the decision involves a
major issue (for example, the donation of a kidney) than when the decision involves
a minor choice (wart removal). Scherer & Reppucci, supra note 91, at 132-36. On
an important decision such as their own custody, adolescents may be less vulnerable
to parental pressure than they might be on matters of less significance.
1,9 Indeed, the paternalistic objective embodied in the best interest standard and
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do not want to live may simply disregard the custody order. Many
adolescents have considerable freedom and mobility that may allow
them to associate with the parent of their choice. Placing a teenager
with a parent with whom he does not wish to live may be a prescription
for failure of the custodial arrangement. The child will be capable
of assuring that the placement is not successful. As one judge in
our study commented, "I don't want to give an order I can't
enforce." Thus, there is a strong functional basis for deferring to
the adolescent's custodial choice. Indeed, if the chosen parent is fit,
there may be no better basis for a custody decision than the child's
preference.
On philosphical and functional grounds, with at least tentative
support from developmental research and theory, an adolescent pref-
erence rule makes sense as a custody decision rule regulating this
category of custody cases. 20 Moreover, given the general probability
that adolescents are "competent" to make custody choices and the
difficulty in devising a competency standard in this context, an
individualized competency requirement is probably not desirable.
Rather, the adolescent's choice need only be restricted if the cus-
todial choice is clearly harmful.
3. The Preferences of Younger Children. The issue is more un-
certain for younger children. Pre-teenagers may be less emotionally
mature and less capable cognitively of making the decision than are
adolescents. Wallerstein and Kelly, studying a clinical sample, found
that children between the ages of nine and twelve experience great
loyalty conflicts at the time of divorce. 1 2 Greenberg found children
in this age group to be less desirous of expressing a custodial
the inquiry based on it may be less suitable in cases involving adolescents than
younger children. Adolescents should arguably have authority to choose their cus-
todian constrained only by a requirement that it not be an overtly harmful choice.
Thus, an adolescent preference rule may be supported on the grounds that deferring
to the child's preference results in the custody decision that reflects the child's best
interest. Alternatively, the argument can be made that courts should be restrained
from the paternalistic effort to protect the welfare of the adolescent by imposing
its judgment about the optimal custody arrangement on the adolescent.
12 It is important to qualify the empirical basis for an adolescent preference
rule. Although the research on cognitive development suggests that adolescents may
be cognitively ready to participate in the decision, the important issues of emotional
development have not been addressed at all.
"I, See J. WALLERSTEiN & J. KELLY, supra note 79, at 77-78.
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preference than teenagers.12 Encouraging the younger child to ex-
press a preference regarding custody may exacerbate the loyalty
conflict and burden the child with a sense of responsibility for
rejecting the unchosen parent.
Another concern about seeking the preferences of younger chil-
dren is that their wishes may reflect a response to the upheaval of
divorce rather than their relationships with each parent. Younger
children are likely more dependent on their parents and family for
security and support than teenagers who typically live in a wider
world. Thus, young children may be less able to accept the disso-
lution of the family, and this may distort the children's decision
making process.' 21 Divorce researchers have observed that children,
especially those in the early school age category, intensely miss the
parent who has left the home. This longing for the absent parent
may influence the child's expression of preferences regarding custody
but may not necessarily reflect stronger long-term attachment bonds
to the missing parent. Another variable that may affect the child's
custody preference is transitory anger directed at one parent during
the divorce process, perhaps at the parent blamed for the divorce. 24
For many children, the real preference may be for the lost intact
family, a desire which the court cannot accommodate.
Another argument for treating younger children differently from
adolescents is that younger children have a reduced interest in self-
determination. Although adolescents probably expect and exercise
considerable freedom in their daily lives, younger children experience
little autonomy. The recent acknowledgment by the law that minors
have liberty interests functions as a recognition that adolescents are
different from their younger brothers and sisters.'2 The trend to-
ward according minors the authority to make medical decisions and
the right to exercise free speech is limited in practice to
I See E. Greenberg, An Empirical Determination of the Competence of Chil-
dren to Participate in Child Custody Decision-Making (unpublished doctoral dis-
sertation available in University of Illinois Microfilms, 1983).
,23 In general, because of the emotional intensity of the divorce context, cognitive
error caused by availability may be particularly strong. See Kahnemann & Tver-
sky, supra note 77.
324 See 3. WALLEsmN & J. KELLY, supra note 79, at 68-70, 74-77.
12 Most thoughtful academic commentary on children's rights has distinguished
adolescents from younger children and argued against the traditional uniform treat-
ment of children of all ages. See generally F. ZrudrNo, supra note 10, at 16-29.
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adolescents.12 6 In part, this distinction is premised on an assumption
that younger children are less competent than older children. The
distinction also reflects an implicit recognition that liberty interests
are less meaningful to younger children who practice little self-
determination. It would not seem controversial that adolescents
should have a more important role in decisions regarding their
custody than younger children. Their autonomy interests are more
compelling legally, normatively, and psychologically than those of
younger children.
IV. SocM. NoRMs AND LEGAL RuLEs IN FAMILY LAW
In this Part we explore a theme suggested by the study results
that offers a useful perspective on broader issues in custody law.
The survey findings suggest that decisions about the custody of
adolescents may reflect not only legal directives but also a social
norm supporting a voice for adolescents in important decisions af-
fecting their lives. Social norms and customs may play a peculiarly
important role in custody law in general. Courts and legislatures
seem to be attentive to the existence or absence of typical models
of family role allocation in intact families and, under some circum-
stances, draw inferences from norms and customs regarding family
roles and behavior. We postulate that sensitivity to social norms in
this context reflects, in part, a response to the task of legal regu-
lation of long-term relationships.
A. The Adolescent Preference Rule and Social Norms
1. Custody Decision Making in the Family. That fewer custody
decisions involve adolescents suggests that some divorcing parents
may defer to their adolescent children's custodial preferences. Why
is this so? One explanation may be that parties upon divorce bar-
gain "in the shadow of the law.' ' 27 If judges are known to defer
to the wishes of adolescents, non-preferred parents may be discour-
aged by their attorneys from seeking custody. These parents may
116 This is especially clear with medical treatment decisions. First, the type of
treatment may only be relevant to adolescents (for example, contraception and
abortion). Second, the requirement that informed consent be given before medical
treatment can be given will exclude younger children who, by most standards, will
not be competent to consent to treatment.
227 See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 72, at 950.
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reluctantly accede to their child's wishes knowing that they stand
little chance of prevailing in court.
While an explicit or implicit adolescent preference rule may con-
tribute to the dearth of custody suits involving teenagers, it seems
unlikely that it is a complete explanation. Rather, it is possible that
many parents who might battle over the custody of a young child
may defer to a teenager's custodial preferences without even con-
sidering the option of litigation.
In the traditional family, parents were authoritarian decision mak-
ers until children grow up and leave home; this model seems to be
eroding. Adolescents would appear to have considerably more free-
dom within the family than they once did. Indeed, adolescence is
a relatively modem construct and by definition suggests a transi-
tional stage between the total dependency of childhood and the
autonomous and independent status of adulthood.'1 This process
includes an evolving orientation to peers rather than parents and a
greater mobility and autonomy; a mobility that likely diminishes
dependence on parents and involvement by parents in their chil-
dren's activities. 129 Certainly by mid-adolescence, many modern teen-
agers are free of close parental supervision. Further, many would
likely assert a claim to participate in a custody decision. It seems
likely that in many families both parents and teenagers would prob-
ably acknowledge the semi-independent status of adolescence.
"2 The introduction of the concept of adolescence as a distinct stage of human
development is often credited to G. Stanley Hall, whose work dates back to the
beginning of the twentieth century. See 1, 2 G. HALL, ADOrnscr~cE (1904). Over
the years, some psychologists' views have emphasized the maturational and biolog-
ical aspects of adolescence; others have concentrated on social learning and culture.
See N. SPn;TaAu. & W. COLUNs, ADOLEScENT PSYCHOLoGy: A DEVELOPMENTAL
ViEw 1-17 (2d ed. 1988). With both emphases, it is the commonly held view that
a complex combination of changes, both in the individual and in society's view
of the individual, create a bridge from the dependence of childhood to the in-
dependence of adulthood. See Conger, Adolescence: A Time for Becoming, in
SOCIAL AND PERSONALIT DEVELOPMENT 131-54 (M. Lamb ed. 1978).
2 See J. COLEMAN, THE ADoI.EscENT Socm'y: THE SociAl LIn Or THE TEEN-
AGER AND ITS IMPACT ON EDUCATION (1961) (a study of high school students in
social groups found that the transition state adolescents experience involves a bal-
ance between parents and friends). Zimring discusses the widespread availability of
automobiles and telephones as important factors contributing to freedom and mo-
bility of modem teenagers and to their independence from their families. See F. ZsmuNa,
supra note 10, at 41-44.
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It is plausible, therefore, that some parents defer to their adoles-
cent children's custody wishes because they, too, believe that grow-
ing independence and maturity confer a claim to participate in this
important decision. For a disfavored parent to vigorously pursue
custody of an unwilling sixteen year old may risk social approba-
tion. 30 Beyond these concerns, however, respect for the "freedom
of choice" of the adolescent may have a functional basis as well.
The parental claim to authority is weakened because the parents
themselves are not in agreement. 3' Furthermore, a parent who wants
custody may realize that an unhappy adolescent will engage in "self-
help" behavior to resist an undesired arrangement. 32 Parents may
decline to litigate custody because they perceive that enforcing a
judicial placement opposed by the child would involve substantial
monitoring costs. The child may, as some judges suggested, simply
ignore the court order. Alternatively, a child may inflict substantial
psychological damage on the non-preferred parent. To be sure,
younger children may also impose costs if not happy with the
-0 This observation suggests the dual meaning of the term social norm. The
concept embodies both that which is typically done within a society (custom) and the rules
for regulating behavior which are sanctioned if breached. Both are relevant here.
It is likely that adolescents are given more control over their custody today; more-
over, many believe that they should be given a voice.
A mild social sanction, disapproval, or gossip, may be the response to a parent's
aggressive pursuit of custody in the face of the teenager's opposition. Many would
probably agree that a teenager who has a preference regarding custody should have
a central role in the decision absent unusual circumstances (such as a preference
for a parent who would provide an unhealthy environment). Gossip and ostracism
may be powerful regulations of behavior. See Merry, Rethinking Gossip and Scan-
dal, in TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTROL, VOLUME 1: FUNDAMEN-
TALs 271 (D. Black ed. 1988) (gossip and scandal flourish whenever there are close-
knit social networks and normative homogeneity, whether the society is small-scale
or complex).
- Further, as long as the parent representing the child's custodial preference
also wants custody, the child's wishes are supported by some claim of parental
authority. Thus, the child's autonomy interest is joined with a claim of parental
authority when balanced against the state's paternalistic claim to decide custody.
32 Ellickson describes the use of self-help as an important mechanism for en-
forcing entitlements (in contrast to legal enforcement). See Ellickson, Critique,
supra note 6, at 87. Ellickson found that the neighbors in Shasta County controlled
each other's behavior through the means of negative gossip or some other form
of retaliation if a neighbor faltered in his behavior. See also A. HmsHUAN, EXIT,




custody arrangement, but because of their dependent status, parents
may predict that they will gradually adjust.
In sum, decisions about custody of adolescents when their parents
divorce are usually made within the family and seemingly pursuant
to a social norm. This norm may have an ethical or a functional
basis. In either case, it supports a recognition by parents today that
adolescents who have a preference should have a voice in custody
decisions.
2. Social Norms and Decision Making by Judges. Evidence from
our study in Virginia suggests that judges (as well as parents) may
be guided by a social norm that adolescents have a voice in the
custody decision. The implicit decision rule favoring the parent pre-
ferred by the adolescent child is evidence of such a norm. Moreover,
the power of the norm is underscored by the fact that the Virginia
statute directs judges to consider a range of other specific factors
in deciding the child's best interest, but does not mention the child's
preference as a relevant consideration.
Recently, a number of scholars have begun to explore the rela-
tionship between social norms and legal rules in the regulation of
social behavior. 33 These analyses challenge the dominant assumption
of "legal centralism," an assumption that stresses the key impor-
tance of announced legal rules in the resolution of disputes and
the regulation of behavior in society. Robert Ellickson has dem-
onstrated that social norms are powerful regulators of behavior,
and form the basis for dispute resolution, particularly in the reg-
ulation of ongoing relationships. Other scholars have demonstrated
the importance of social norms in the regulation of business/con-
sumer relationships and of long-term contractual relationships.""
Social control objectives are more readily advanced when social
norms and legal rules function as complements and are mutually
"1 Eickson, Critique, supra note 6, at 67.
'3 Besides the studies of Macaulay and Scott described in supra note 6, other
researchers have examined the importance of social norms in regulating behavior.
See H. Ross, SErTLED OUr OF COURT: Tim SociAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLUIMS
AwruswmEr (1980) (study of variance between negligence rules applied by insurance
adjusters and legal rules); Ross & Littlefield, Complaint as a Problem-Soh'ing
Mechanism, 12 LAw & Soc'y Rv. 199 (1978) (study of appliance retailer-customer
relations suggests retailers refund policy more liberal than law requires).
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reinforcing. 35 If legal rules do not conform to social norms they
may either be ignored or reshaped, or enforcement will be costly.
This is not to say that legal rules should always conform to social
norms. A dominant norm, or one accepted by a sub-group in the
society, may be deemed morally wrong and legal regulation that
attempts to change it may be fully justified. In such situations, the
significant enforcement and monitoring costs associated with resis-
tance to legal regulation are anticipated and acceptable prices to
pay for the desired goals of a more just social order. Legal regu-
lations to combat racial discrimination are only the most obvious
examples of this category. What is important for legal policy makers
to understand, however, is the pervasiveness of social norms and
the role that they have in regulating social behavior.
The relationship between social norms and legal rules is an im-
portant dimension of the legal regulation of child custody. For
instance, courts in Virginia seem to have reshaped a legal rule to
conform to a social norm of adolescent self-determination. This
response may imply that the judges have internalized the social
norm (the traditional wisdom about custody decision making).136
Alternatively, it may represent a judicial determination to use the
norm as the basis for resolving custody disputes. This determination
in turn derives either singly or in combination from two factors.
First, judges may simply determine that departing from the social
norm is too costly in this context. Second, judges may view the
search for the social norm as the appropriate judicial role in de-
,-" Ellickson describes the tradition of legal centralism beginning with Thomas
Hobbes. Hobbes saw no possibility that some nonlegal system of social control
might bring about a medium of order; rather, he believed that a society without
a sovereign would be chaotic. Ellickson, supra note 6, at 81-84. Legal centrists, in
Ellickson's view, exaggerate the role of the state as the sole source of legal control
and undervalue the importance of informal controls such as social norms. Hobbes'
bleak version of life in the state of nature is pure legal centralism. Law and
economics scholars have been extreme legal centrists, in Ellickson's view, since they
deny the possibility that controllers other than the state can generate and enforce
entitlements. Id. at 82-83. Legal rule makers may adopt an extreme legal centrist
view when they assume that changing the law will readily change behavior.
216 One criticism of the broad discretion accorded judges under the best interest
of the child standard is that they will apply their own values in deciding which
parent's custody is best for the child. Weitzman & Dixon, Child Custody Awards:
Legal Standards and Empirical Patterns for Child Custody, Support and Visitation
After Divorce, 12 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 473, 504 (1979).
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ciding important "relational" issues. Decisions about custody mat-
ter a great deal; they affect the lives of family members in important
and pervasive ways. Furthermore, a custody decision does not in-
volve a discrete transaction. Rather, it sets the course of an ongoing
relationship for years into the future. If the legal decision is not
reinforced by normative constraints, it may require continued mon-
itoring. If many people, including the teenagers involved, believe
that adolescents should have a role in the decision about their place-
ment, variance from this norm may result in unstable outcomes.
B. Social Norms and Policy: Interpreting the Recent History of
Custody Law
Social norms and customs are important, not just to understand-
ing judicial decision making, but also to the formulation of legal
rules. Saul Levmore has argued that when the behavioral effects of
alternative forms of legal regulation are predictable and have an
important social control function, then legal rules tend to be uni-
form across ancient and modern legal systems.' 37 On the other hand,
where the behavioral effects of alternative rules are unclear or the
behavior itself involves matters about which reasonable people may
differ in the society, the legal regulation of these behaviors may
tend to vary. 38 Levmore's analysis suggests a perspective for think-
ing about the relationship between social norms and legal rules in
a single society as well. In periods when there is consensus about
an important social norm, legal rules will tend to reflect the norm,
and enforcement and monitoring costs will be low. In times of
change that are characterized by conflicting ideologies, the law is
less likely to track a clear social norm. The legal rules may thus
be less predictable. Rules may adhere to the traditional norm or
they may promote a new ideology that seeks to displace the old.
In the latter instance, the rule itself may reflect an effort to shape
and influence the social norm toward the new ideology. In circum-
stances where norms are evolving, rulemakers, confronted with con-
flicting ideologies, may instead adopt discretionary standards that
13 Levmore, Rethinking Comparative Law.: Variety and Uniformity in Ancient
and Modern Tort Law, 61 Tui.. L. REv. 235 (1986).
,3 Thus all societies, ancient and modern, have rules that discourage theft and
negligent behavior. In contrast, legal systems vary in procedural rules. Id. at 238.
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allow judges to "choose a norm." Thus, the use of broad legal
standards may be a recognition that no dominant social norm reg-
ulating behavior exists to serve as the basis for a clear legal rule.
These observations form the basis for an admittedly conjectural
interpretation of developments in custody law in the last generation.
During an era when the dominant norm regulating family respon-
sibilities was that mothers should be caretakers of children, the legal
rule officially complemented this norm by strongly favoring mothers
over fathers in custody disputes. One way of looking at the recent
movement to the gender neutral best interest of the child standard
is that it was a response to some perceived erosion of the traditional
norm regulating family roles or a mild effort to promote a new
ideology. 39 To the extent that the change in the legal rule reflected
this latter objective, it suggested a promotion of more flexible pa-
rental roles. In turn, this makes the prediction about the better
custodian upon divorce less clear than the tender years presumption
would have suggested.
As a broad discretionary test, the best interest standard permits
judges to choose between conflicting norms. Apparently, courts in
general have adopted the more traditional norm in their decisions,
even though the legal standard is ostensibly neutral. There is sub-
stantial evidence that courts applying the best interest standard do
so in a way that is favorable to mothers, and fathers typically do
not prevail in custody disputes unless they are able to demonstrate
that the mother has some serious disability."40 These results are often
attributed to the insidious biases of judges. Another explanation is
119 Thus, as more mothers of young children entered the work force and fathers
took an increasingly active parenting role, the presumption that the mother was
the optimal custodian on divorce was challenged. See Roth, The Tender Years
Presumption in Child Custody Disputes, 15 J. Fm. L. 423, 448-57 (1977) (chal-
lenging the premise that status as biological mother signifies capacity to promote
child's best interests).
1,0 See Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 136, at 504-05. Mothers obtain custody
in 90% of cases; 98% of attorneys believe judges prefer mothers. Id. at 503-07.
Fathers are not advised to seek custody unless the mother has abandoned the child
or is unfit. Id. at 508-15. See Lambe, Handling Contested Custody Cases, 88 CAsE
& Comm. 3 (Jul.-Aug. 1983) (suggesting guidelines for the practitioner dealing with
difficulties fathers face in suing for custody). Pearson and Ring found that under
Colorado's best interest standard, mothers got custody if they were fit. Pearson &




that judges in awarding custody to mothers are continuing to track
a powerful social norm which, in fact, has not suffered significant
erosion. There is ample evidence today that mothers continue to
assume the major responsibilities of caring for children.14 1 The dis-
cretionary standard gives courts the freedom to subscribe to the
goal of gender neutrality or to reinforce the presumably stronger
traditional norm; courts seem inclined to opt for the latter course.' 2
Virginia's statutory version of the best interest of the child stan-
dard does not include the custodial preference of adolescents among
the factors for judicial consideration. This is puzzling and may
reflect nothing more than legislative oversight; a plausible
explanation, given that the child's preference is explicitly included
in the statutory prescriptions in many states. Moreover, it is not
surprising that the apparent "oversight" has created few problems.
The best interest standard, even in a form that offers some guidance
to decision makers, permits significant latitude to courts. Thus, courts
are free, under the Virginia statute, to follow the norm regarding
adolescent participation that we have described. We have argued
that judges in typically awarding custody of younger children to
mothers appear to track the traditional norm regarding parental
roles without statutory direction to do so. As children grow older,
the traditional norm seems less compelling; it may be supplanted
141 See Barnett, Determinants of Father's Participation in Child Care (Paper
presented at American Psychological Association meeting in Anaheim, California
1983); Cunningham, Women Still Do Majority of Child Care Housework, APA
MoNrrOR, Nov. 1983, at 16 (in study of 160 families, 113 fathers were responsible
for no child care tasks); Jacobson, Beyond Empiricism: The Politics of Marital
Therapy, 11 Am. J. FAm. THmEAiY 11, 18 (Summer 1983) (citing studies indicating
that mothers fill primary parental roles).
-, The same response may be seen in the operation of joint custody laws.
Legislative lobbyists for joint custody advocate laws promoting shared parenting
responsibilities (joint physical custody), and argue that a new social norm supports
this arrangement. In fact, this norm is largely aspirational; it seems unlikely that
in most families mothers and fathers share parenting responsibilities equally. Scott
& Derdeyn, supra note 13, at 483. There is evidence that joint custody orders by
courts seem more typically to result in child care arrangements that approximate
sole custody and visitation, with mothers assuming a primary role in child care.
See Koopman, Hunt & Stafford, Child Related Agreements in Mediated & Non-
Mediated Divorce Settlements: A Preliminary Examination and Discussion of Im-
plications, 22 CoNc. CTs. Riv. 19 (1984). One reason women have typically
resisted joint custody reform legislation may be a view that it distorts the social
norm and disadvantages mothers who have fulfilled traditional roles before divorce.
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by a norm favoring decisional participation by adolescents. Under
the broad directive to reach the outcome that reflects the child's
best interest, courts are free to track evolving social norms regulat-
ing family roles.
CONCLUSION
Courts in Virginia receive no statutory guidance about obtaining
evidence from children in custody proceedings or about how the
child's preference about custody should be weighed in the judicial
decision. Our study of judges suggests that the child's age is the
critical variable influencing judicial practice; the extent to which
judges hear directly from children and seriously consider their pre-
ferences is clearly correlated with age. This judicial response receives
support from several perspectives. It is consistent with child devel-
opment research and theory and with a trend toward expanded
recognition of adolescents as persons with a stake in important
decisions affecting their lives. Moreover, recognition of adolescents'
preferences regarding custody may represent judicial deference to a
social norm regarding family roles. In regulating long-term relation-
ships between adolescents and their divorced parents, tracking social
norms may increase the stability of outcomes and in other ways
reduce the costs of legal enforcement.
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